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1962/11/15

ENTED ET A. MILETERT - 11/16/62

HENCHARDUR OF CONVERSATION

Bov. 15, 1962 Tim: 6-9:20 PM

Place Soviet Mission, Hew York

PARTICIPANTS: US - Ambassador Stavenson

Ambassador Yost Mr. Pederson

Mr. Engeteev

Mr. Mendelevich

Mr. Zherestace

Mr. Zarin

Nr. Abalovsky

DEPARTMENT OF STATE, A/CDC/MB

USSR -Cat. A) Caption removed; transferred to OVEADRO Cat. B - Transferred to 0./FADRO

with additional access controlled by S/S

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Amb. Stevenson noted that this meeting was timely and mint be was gled that Mr. Kuznetsev had arranged for it. The reason for this was that he had just come from U Thent who had told him about a letter from Castro in which Castro was threatening to shoot down our recommaissance planes because of violation of Cuben air space. He stressed that this was a very serious matter, and when this became public tomorrow the consequences, at least publicly, mental were predictable.

Amb. Stevenson stressed that in view of the fact that the USER had been erform with the respect to UN observation and supervision over mylection of the agreement, the Cuben threat was tentemount to the threat of force against the emly means the US had of observing compliance with the agreement. In these circumstances, while the Cuben letter had not yet been discussed with Mashington, he felt that the Cuben protest would be met by


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emether protect. He hoped that this would be the end of it; otherwise the consequences with respect to what might happen would not be our responsibility.

Mr. Managery said that with regard to US flights over Cuben territory has could hardly add anything to what he had said at the last meeting. He could only reaffirm the Soviet view that those flights were illegal, a violation of the UM Charter, and a gross interference in the internal affairs of Cuba. There was no justification for such flights. One could not motivate these flights by saying that the USSR had not performed with regard to co-site inspection, because the USSR was not going back on its obligations and had given may the US an opportunity to check the fulfillment of its obligations. He believed that this procedure of verifying ships carrying misciles had been discussed at length between the two sides, and that this operation had been carried out satisfactorily. The USSR had been cooperative and the US had also shown an understanding attitudes in that situation.


Mr. Resnetsov continued that from Amb. Stevenson's statement he drev
a different conclusion, namely, that time had come to accelerate the
settlement of the whole Cuben problem. He said he had asked Amb. Stevenson
to come to this meeting because he wished to express some views in exprection
with the Soviet-Cuben joint draft protocol, which had been given to U Thant
for temperature to the US. The protocol had been prepared to speed up the
settlement and to seeme a long term solution of the problem. The USER
believed that the magnitistions on a settlement of the Cuben crisis must now
enter a new, decisive stage. Of course, there remained some questions which
were still unsettled and over which the two sides differed, but these steps
already taken indeported.






provided marriagest basis for developing and presenting to the UN a document containing a final solution of the problem and inclinding all the obligations of all the parties concerned. When the USSE referred to the steps already taken, it had in mind primarily the steps taken by the USSE in connection with the withdrawal of missiles from Cubs. As had already been mentioned, in many within the context of the Kennedy-Khrushchev agreement the USSE had undertaken to stop the work on MREM sites and to dissentle those systems. As was clearly evident from the President's October 27 letter, all other steps were to be taken only after a long term settlement of the Cuben erisis had been arrived at and after verification by the UN of the obligations of all parties had been arranged. However, to create a better strosphere for further negotiations and to demonstrate to all states, and the US in particular, that it was honestly carrying out its obligations, the USSE had agreed to withdraw risables even before agreement on an a/settlement of the Cuben crisis had been reached.


Mr. Runnetsov believed that this was the first time is/history of modern that that international relations/shem a great power had fulfilled its obligations considerably earlier than had been agreed upon previously. On the other hand, the President's October 27 letter contained assurences with regard to the willingness of the ML after a settlement through the UN, to lift immediately the quantities and Mr give assurences against invasion of Cuba, as well as a the statement of the President's confidence that/other countries of the Western Remisphere would do likewise. The President's confidence in this respect was, in the view of the USSR, the very basis on which, after the necessary formalization, the Caribbean situation could be normalized. Thus, the USSR





believed that now there existed all the necessary conditions for a final and lasting motificant of the Cohen crisis. But one side's willingness to reach such swilliams was not sufficient; willingness on the part of both sides was required. The USER believed that it was necessary to consider the entire problem as a whole and not to take out artifically individual questions or to advance such matters as were unrelated to the problem itself, matters which could only complicate the situation and delay a settlement. The USER believed that it was now possible to proceed with the preparation of such a settlement. Such a settlement would help in removing the unnecessary things which only hindered the solution of the problem and made it difficult to agree on a lang term settlement of the Cuben situation. To start such a preparation, it was necessary to turn from discussion of the problem in general to the discussion of a document subracing the whole magnet questions relating to a final settlement of the Cuben problem.

Mr. Knemetacy continued that as far as the Seviet Union understood, the vose
US vescalso not opposed to the possibility of putting this final settlement
in a document to be submitted to the UK. This economism could be drawn from
Mr. Stevenson's remarks in the source of earlier discussions to the effect that
the positions of the two sides on a final settlement were close in spirit and
that the UB was prepared to make a statement in the Security Council. In the
course of province discussions, the US had expressed the desire of having the
USER person like views in a document. The Seviet and the Cuben Governments
had juintly propared a document and submitted it to U Thant with the request
that it be transmitted to the UB. Mr. Expresses said he also wished to give
a copy of the document to Mr. Stevenson now.





MINISTER SAMELING the paper to Amb. Stevenson, Mr. Kummteov said he vished to make same glassifications so as to enable the US to understand the Soviet pacifications. He said the USSE believed that since three parties were involved in this problem, the best form of a dominant was a protocol containing the obligations of the three governments, to be signed by those three governments and approved by the Security Council. In accordance with the Khrushchev -Emmedy correspondence, and also taking into account the statement of Fidel Castro, the draft protocol should include and in fact included the following obligations:

On the part of the US: (1) Discontinuance of all measures religion to the so-called quarantine; (2) Withdrawal of the Edg concentrated in the southeast of the Edg

- (3) Non-intervention in Cubs and prevention of intervention by others; (4) Respect for the sovereignty of Cubs and non-interference in Cubs's internal affairs; (5) Cosestion of subversive management activities against Cubs; (6) Non-interference with the free emercies by Cubs of its trade and economic relations with others; Entry

 (7) Towarder into negotiations with Cubs on
- (7) Townson into negotiations with Cube on Ouentaness.
- the part of the USSR: (1) Restrimetion of the fact that it had vithdrawn from Cuba these types of weapons on which agreement had been reached, and that the US





had been given the opportunity of ascertaining such withdrawal.

of the weepons mentioned above; (2) Restriction of the fact that the basis of Coba's policy is to adhere to the principles of the United Mation including the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of other states.

In this connection, Mr. Munetary went on, itemstical intermedial formed and intermedial correspondence gave rise to the question of some form of varietables of compliance with the obligations by the parties. The societate presided some measures for the solution of this question; the parties concerned would be prepared to carry out measures relating to the U Thank proposal for a W presence in the Caribbean to observe compliance by all parties. This was an important point which should be streamed. It should also be streamed that a final final final cuben crisis required equal rights, equal obligations, and equal cooperation with respect to all parties; it mine required equality of all parties with respect to compliance with the obligations. This point derived from the UK Charter.

We dietated by the entire past experience of US-Cohen relations, which





convincingly shaped the existence of aggressive intentions on the part of the UE against this small republic. From U Thent's segmention, it followed that the warification system should cover parts of US territory as well as other countries in the Western Busisphere. Elementarized For its part, the Cuben Government supported in principle U Thent's suggestion for the creation of a UE presence in the Caribbean. Since the UE Government said that it had apprehensions with respect to the possibility of an attack by Cube - although it must be/statest that such statements on the part of such a powerful country did not sound serious - the Cuben Government agreed that varification be also exercised, on the basis of reciprocity, with respect to Cube as well, so as to dispel any alleged doubte as regards Cube's aggressive tendencies.

Mr. Exemption them said that these proposals were of course stated only in principle; they were only an outline or a basis for some future mechanism to be spelled out and formalised. However, upon agreement of the parties, it should not be difficult for W Thank to work out the details of such UN presence in the Caribbean in consultation with the parties concerned.

In sammary, Nr. Kusnetsov said, he wished to state that in handing this document the USER hoped that on this basis agreement could be reached on a final and lasting settlement of the Cuban crisis normalizing the situation in the Garibbean. The basis for this hope was the fact that the US and the USER, as had been stated by some objective people in the US press, were able, when they wanted analyzes, to reach quick agreement on important and sometimes occuplicated and difficult problems. This was also preven by the fact that in the course of the exchange of messages between Ostober 22 and Ostober 27, prompt prevent had been taken to present thermometheer estantrophe, the/messite of which measures had been taken to present thermometheer estantrophe, the/messite of which measurements could be felt/so near, and a basis had been provided for the solution of the Cuban crisis.



The WEST-believed that, if both sides showed good will and sincere desire for a speedy polistica, they ought to be able to present for consideration by the Security Council as agreed document ending this dangerous crisis and giving confidence to the peoples of the world that such a crisis would not recur in the future. The Soviet Delegation was prepared to work on this noble task.

Mr. Ensuetsov them said he wished to touch briefly upon a procedural point.

Since the document just handed to Amb. Stevenson had been properties submitted affected
by two governments and affected the interests of three governments, them as a matter of principle, since each of those governments was a sovereign one and also from the practical standpoint so as not to lose too much innex entre time that place in reaching agreement, the USSE believed it useful to have these meetings/mmeng the three parties, i.e.,/tripartite negotiations. Sectionality and administrational classifications in the partie of the UE Charter and also with the practice of some international negotiations in the past. This was the Soviet view on this point, which was being put forward for consideration by the US, and the USSE wished to reach agreement on this matter.

Amb. Stevenson said he believed he sould be brief in his response. Firstly, we wanted Mr. Examples to note the protect we had lodged here the other night against any interference with flights of US places until agreement was reached. Assume that the US had accepted ship-side imagestims of the removal of missiles not because he thought it was as effective as UN observation and supervision set forth in the agreement, but rather to accommodate the USSE. We provided consideration on the part of the Soviet Union with respect to the only means of observation which had now been

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left to me, and not promise of any fault of ours/at that.

oon said we were as eager as the USSR to reach a settlement of the Caben situation and we were not advancing any new questions beyond those contained in the Kennedy-Khrushchev correspondence. Referring to Mr. Kusnetsov's remark that the US was agreeable to a document or protocol to be agreed between the US and the USER and presented to the Security Council, he said he was afraid he must correct and remind Mr. Exemptsow that the US Delegation had said on numerous occasions at these meetings that the US believed that the proper very was to make mutual declarations in the Security Council. Indeed, Mr. Marashchev's letter referred in several places to such declarations. As to the protocol handed annual now and also received becaus from U Thank earlier, this document was the best evidence of the impossibility to reach any agreement in writing by a present of this kind. Furthermore, the US Delegation had reminded the Soviet Delegation repeatedly of the US rejection of all these conditions of Castro. Time. Amb. Stevenson said, he had to report what he had said many times before, namely, that when the USSR had performed its part of the agreement, the US would do two things it was obliged to do under the agreement: (a) lift the guarantine, and (b) make a declaration in the Security Council against invasion of Cubs. As to what the Latin American countries would do, he could only say that the US would ten that the status que prior to October 22, when the trouble/started, be

Anh. Storeness Secalled that at the last meeting he had asked for loviet suggestions for compliance with the condition in the President's October 27th letter that the USSE would undertake not to introduce such weapons in the feture.






He thought perhaps Mr. Extrateov had some suggestions with respect to such seconds. He has mid that Mr. Extrateov had suggested some principles advanced by W Thank; he was sorry that he did not know what they were and therefore could not comment at this time.

However, Amb. Stevenson continued, the interesting in Mr. Emmeteov's statement was that there was nothing in it about the most important question, the namely, removal of/IL-26 aircraft. He repeated that the US was eager to reach a speedy settlement in the spirit of mutual accommodation, which the US had been demonstrating all along, and expressed the hope that agreement could be reached on other questions, beyond the Cuban problem, which minist were so imperient in the important world today. However, Cuba was the most/immediate problem and, within its melhing was more important than removal of the IL-26 bombers. As to Mr. Emmeteon's suggestion for tripartite discussions, Amb. Stevenson pointed out that the agreement was between the US and the USSE and immediate he believed the discussions should stay between the US and the USSE, because there was no other party to that agreement.

Mr. Numerican said he had already stated the Soviet view on overflights. The only thing he wished to say now was that the USSE could not agree with the US contention that it had no other way then to fly over Caba and violate its territorial assumptions. He believed Mr. Stevenson would agree those flights were unastableauty, gastlenlarly now when, as the US knew, all missiles had been withdrawal had been a verified by U.S. Newy vessels. At any the Soviet rate, he could only reaffirm abandancies statement on overflights which had been made at the meeting on November 13.



ocuments.

We Ministery then expressed occorry by about Amb. Stevenson's similaring actions

continuously the Mar Mayiet/Araft protocol, and said that if one took a careful leak at the provisions in that paper, one would see that they were directed at resolving the problem, liquidating tensions, and creating a normal situation in the Carribbean. As he understood, UE and Seviet vishes on this latter point coincided. He did not think Amb. Stevenson's affort to attach to the document the label of Castre represented a good or justified approach. Such an approach could be adopted only if one did not wish to be businesslike. The protocol contained nothing which went beyond the Kennedy-Khrushchev exchange or Castre's were aimed letter, which may mound at normalizing the situation.

Mr. Exercises said he was also concerned by Amb. Stavenson's statement advancing a new formula with respect to the states in the Western Managhton. The President's letter made ne reference to the status guo ente. The USER had not agreed to some status quo, but had remaked agreement immedian to eliminate this crisis and erente such conditions as would prevent its recurrence in the future, since this crisis could aggreeate the situation and threaten the peace. Thus, here one most precoed not on the basis of some new formula, but of the President's letter.

As to Soviet assurances against reintroduction of those weapons in the future, that shlighting skill stood and the USER was prepared to ecoperate in this respect to end/out with the WE was appropriate formula for such assurances. With regard to guarantees, the MMR believed that a UK presence in the Carribboun would be of great help. Mr. Stevenson had said he was not sware of the contents of that proposal, but they had been referred to by the Seviet Delegation during previous meetings. The proposal was not complicated; it provided for placing UK teems in



worked out if all parties cooperated with and assisted U Thant in his work on this problem. Mr. Remoters expressed the view that all questions which were still unrevolved on which the US insisted, in verification, etc., main could be resolved if agreement more was reached on this point.

Firning to the question of the IL-36 bombers, Mr. Emerteev noted he had stated the Soviet view on this matter at the last meetings and had nothing to add.

However, he wished to stress that the US proposal made at the last meeting was not aimed at resolving the Caban problem as a whole or at developing the diligations of all parties; nor was it aimed at developing guarantees to the Caban people that they could live in peace or guarantees that no such exists would recent in the Matter future. In other words, the time had now come when one had to lay the basishs on the table and see how to construct the settlement of the problems as a whole.

However, the formula suggested by Asb. Stevenson at the last meeting did not lead to this objective and did not help to solve the problem in accordance with the Kennedy-Chrushobev correspondence. As to the individual points which had to be resolved within the whole problem, they were known to Asb. Stevenson and they were reflected in the draft document. Of course, if one wished to passing the solution of the tables assemble of the solution of the problem in solution.

this idea had been just forward for consideration by the US because the USSR sincerely wished to find a solution reflecting and meeting the interests of all the parties concerned. Furthermore, as Mr. Iorin had just reminded him, the



Security Security had enthorised 8 Themt to bring together the three parties to commy sed commitmations under his guidance. It would be best if the three parties endid att together and consider all those issues. Nr. Stevenson would agree that many of the issues directly affected Cuba, involved chligations by Cuba, and could voice being not be resolved without Cuba's anticonscious beard. The USSE believed that such a procedure would be practical and would be appreciated by the Americans who were practical people themselves and knew the value of time.

Mr. Exemption them said he windows to stress his concern about Amb. Stevenson's statement that the US would comply with its obligations when the USEE had performed its part of the agreement. If one were to follow such an approach, the problem could be enclosely protracted because the US could always claim that the not performed some of its obligations. He wished to repeat exce again it USSR had already done more than was provided for in the President's October 27 letter. If Mr. Stevenson were to read that letter again, he would see that all that was required was immuney/muck for work to come on missile installations and that those installations be dismentled; everything else was to take place within the framework of a general settlement. However, the USSE was negotiating honestly and it believed it neeful to demonstrate its sincereity. Therefore, it had done much more than was previded for in the President's letter. Eftime of to show its desire to resolve the Cohen problem as soon s will as to resolve other problems, and here, Mr. Eugeteov Said, pack with Mr. Stevenson that other problems should be resolved too. However, if one sought all the time to find some points which allegedly had not been fulfilled by the other side, then no end sould be seen to negotiations. He vished to appeal to the US to consider the decement submitted today carefully



and to turn to identificance there is the discussion of a specific document, so that the WEER special see that the US was guided by the same feelings as the USS

Ask. Flowmen said he could perhaps accelerate this discussion. Mr. Name had raised several points. Mr. Eugheteov had expressed concern with respect to what the Latin American countries would do and with respect to the status quo before October 22, saying to this was a new formula. Amb. Stevenson said that what he had meant here was that im the US would take the initiative in the OAS to ask for the repeal of the October 23 resolution adopted by the OAS in authoriz the quarantine and the other measures taken by the US to ensure the present of minuthened and offensive vespons from Subs. Once this resolution was repealed, the situation would revert to the status quo before October 22 and all rights and obligations under the Rio Post would apply, including the chlimati with regard to invasion by one state against enother. This was no new formula and was consistent with the President's letter. Indeed, it went even further and it showed what the US wanted to do to induce the Latin American countries against invesion of Cubs. As to the question of a UK presence in the Carribbean and Mr. Empetery's remark that it would be easy to some to me prompt agreement on the details of such an arrangement, and. Stevenson said he was afraid that he could n answer that point; he would have to find out more about it and would be glad to distant in their man.

Modelling Mr. Momestor's remark that the US suggestion with regard to the security of the Model tembers was not based on a desire to resolve the whole problem, And. Stevenson wondered whether the draft proteonl was based on such a desire, because it contained no reference to the IL-26's. And. Stevenson them pointed out that he had repeated again and again that the US did want to resolve

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We whale problem and that it did know what the questions to be solved were. For Mr. Manufactor's bessell, he could recibe them again. In order to resolve the whole problem as some as procedule, the USSE should:


- 1. Remove offensive weapons, im, the IL-26's;
- 2. Give assurances that all number components, variends and nuclear serial bombs, had been removed:
- 3. Provide on-site inspection in Cuba to verify completion of the transaction in accordance with Mr. Khrushchev's letter;
- 4. Give the US assurances against reintroduction of offensive pappons in the future; and
- 5. Give the US suggestions for enfequence against reintroduction of puch weapons in the future.

As far as the US was concerned, its wafulfilled obligations were:

- 1. To kink the quarantine;
- 2. To give Cube assurances against invesion; and To seek
- 3. Such the cooperation of the Latin American countries with respect to non-invasion.

The US had assumed no other obligation under the agreement immax vis-a-vis either the USSR or Cuba. If the Soviet representatives disputed ampossizition any part of inventory this limit of disputed, it would help our discussions if individual cases were taken up to the past place were disputed.

negotiations, saying he could not believe that this proposal had been advanced seriously if the USER sincerely desired to settle the problem promptly. There had was no need for prolongation, and we hold the USER on many occasions of our conditions. Now was the time_for the USER to any what it agreed to do on the basis



of this invistory of unfortakings.

Mr. Summing said he agreed that the time had come to express summaid freshly and samplestely; the point was, however, that the USSR had already done so, but not the US.

As to the status quo and restoration of the situation existing prior to October 23, Mr. Exemption said he wished to ask the US set to involve the USER in what it did with other countries in the Mestern Hemisphere, or in measures the US imposed on Latin American countries or wished to repeal. The US knew that the USER had never recognized and did not recognize decisions by the GAS. The same applied to the Rio Part. This was the United States' can besimes, and the USER would proceed on the basis of the Kennedy-Ehrushchev exchange.

Mr. Ensmetacy said he had already stated what had to be done to results this problem, but the US wished to substitute for that its relations with the GAS, although it knew that the USER did not recognize GAS decisions.

Mr. Kummatoov them said he took note of Mr. Staveneom's statement that he would consider the question of a UK presence and that he would discuss it after he had studied it. Turning to the situation with respect to the fulfillment of obligations, Mr. Kummatsev said he wished to stress that any objective person would say that the USSE had fulfilled its obligations but that the situation was referred to different as sequence the US. Anh. Stavenson had massion the IL-26's and the fact that Many name and amendment in the draft protocol. The USSE had already stated the visual Many Name and amendment in the draft protocol. The USSE had already stated the visual Many Name and amendment it believed that the pulses protocol could resolve the problem at head even without raising the IL-26's. What the USSE had done provided a basis for the settlement of the entire problem.



SECRET - EVES CELY

. Stevenson's remark about the problem of removal of all 1986 by the USSE, Mr. Expertsoy said he had already discussed this subject, but he wished to repeat what he had said earlier and was authorized to state the following: All werheads for missiles had been removed immediately after the edoption by the USSE of the decision for the dismentling and removal of missile sites, and this had been done before the arrangements for ship-side verification were made. He was also suthorised to state firsty that all nuclear weapons had been removed from Cuba. He hoped that this statement was sufficient to dispose of this question. The USSR was making this new step to stress its sincere desire to resolve the whole problem as soon as possible. As to inspetts of the vespons removed, the USSR had given the US the opportunity of verifying and MeanmanneatonCommunicate the operation of the removal of weapons and had exagreed to a procedure including counting and taking photographs. When the BB now said that this obligation had not been fulfilled by the USSE, this created the impression that the US was doing so for thu a purpose which had nothing to do with the objective of speeding up the second He wished to repeat once again that with regard to co-cite inspection in Cuba Mr. Khrushchev's Orteber 27 letter stated that the USSR did not object to such an arrangement but that, of course, such inspection was subject to consent from the mist As segards manner non-introduction of the vespons withdrawn, Bad stated in Mr. Ehroshchev's message that it would not 10 wagens. This consistent still stood. As to the governtees in this respect, it was now the common problem of the US and the USSR to see how the fulfillment of obligations by the parties would be observed and verified. The USSR believed that the proposal which the two sides would have an opportunity

SECRET - MISS CHLY

the discount would provide possibilities in this respect, including assurances for in to in to the discount that those weapons would not be reintroduced in fake. Furthermore since the asset to have this proposal assisting to its territory as well, apparently possibilities could be found for it a satisfactory solution of this question too. If the US had any views on this point, it would be well to hear them so as to know what they were.

Thus, Nr. Kurnstsov continued, as Nr. Stevenson could see the USSR had
fulfilled its obligations. But when one looked at how the US had been fulfilling
its obligations, one must saw a different situation: the quarantine had not been
lifted; the overflights continued; an unbridled compaign was being contented
against Cube in the US press, apparently not without the US Government's handedge;
the US had submitted no proposals as to how it would formulate the chliquitions
relating to guarantees to Cube and the obligations of Latin American countries,
to be presented to the Security Council. In short, the time had come, indeed,
to engage in a thorough discussion, but Hammanquienthandthismchanners now it was
for the US to do so. He wished to stress this is all frankness. He wished to ask
the US
for specific suggestions and also for To views on the draft protocol.

Ash. Stevenson said he believed he could ensur Mr. Enmetsov right every. He believed there had been some progress. As he understood, Mr. Enmetsov had said that (1) the MMR would give assurances that all matter vectors had been removed from Cally (2) the USER would give assurances against reintroduction by offensive uniquents (1) some system of a UF presence should be nutually considered as a fature anisquard with respect to non-reintroduction of offensive vectors. In response to Mr. Enmetsov's comment that the assurances under (1) and (2) had already been given, Rub. Stevenson said that he meant assurances within the

made in the Security Council. Ash. Stevenson certimed that questions: (1) final on-site verification; while we had heard pr. Descriptor's remarks about ship-side varification of missiles, we gathered no verification was contemplated with respect to a completion of the transaction in Cube, and thus this question remained open; and (2) removal of the IL-28 bombers. We, therefore, hoped that at the next meeting we would hear proposals by the Soviet thich on these two points, and also that we could discuss a future UE presence. On the US side, when these conditions were fulfilled, the following would have to be implementation done: (1) lift the quarterline, and the US had said that it would lift the quarentine immediately am upon oral assurances from the USER that the II-de bombers would be removed within a limited period of time; (2) give assurances in a declaration in the Security Council, and we would be glad to submit to the Soviet Delegation a draft of such declaration; and (3) obtain ecoperation of the Latin American countries in the CAS; if Mr. Rismeteov did not like our suggestion for reinstatement of obligations with regard to non-expression under the Rio Fact, perhaps he could tell us what he would like, bearing in mind not only what he liked but also what we sould get from the latin Asserisan countries. Amb. Stevenson said this summarised the outstanding points, both on the Soviet and the US side. He said he wished to repeat that the US was assists to settle the satter harmoniously maly and then to present to the Security Council appropriate declarations. I would provide to remove the bumbers, the quarentine would have been Who daily declaration the US would have to make would relate to assurances against invasion and to stops it would take to obtain the ecoperation of Latin American countries.





said that the fact that Amb. Stevenson had said the US would do sertein things upon fulfillment of certain conditions by the USSR meant that biomyting to make the whole problem contingent upon its understanding of the situation and upon its views on the solution of the problem. However, this approach was one of inequality. He vished to reiterate that we had now reached the stage where a document must be discussed which would enhance all the questions deriving from the Kennedy-Khrushchev emchange, but the US wanted to continue the discussions on the basis that the USSE must continue to fulfill one thing after another while the US did not may anything concrete. Such regotiations were not based on the principle of equality. The URSR did not understand such an amount because it had done so much whereas the US kept saying that the USCE should do one thing after another. The USSE now wished to state clearly, so that the be no missuderstanding, that the negotiations had now reached the stage where the US should give produce a document about what obligations it was propared to full fulfill and how. The USSE was going to discuss this matter and seek the attainment of this objective. The UE should adhere to the October 27 letter of the President and should not impose its views on the USSR. The USSR had gone even further than that letter, and he wished to remind Mr. Stevenson of the contents additional statements Mr. Musnetacy then quoted the first two paragraphs of the October 27 letter of School to draw Mr. Stevenson's attention to this partion of the that the negotiations should embrace the whole problem and A with individual questions. If the US kept raising individual questions, there would be no assummee that the negetiations would ever end. The Soviet position had already been stated and it was not proper for Ministering the US to interpret it its own way. The USER was conducting serious negotiations

THE PARTY

and the time transmitter the impose one's own interpretation on the other side.

Here Manustray mentioned that Amb. Stevenson had asked him how the US should deal with the Nation American countries. He wondered why the US wanted to involve in the USSE with this matter. The USSE proceeded from the President's letter. If it protocol, although if vere clearly stated,—as was must in the draft protocol, although that particular language was not satisfactory to the US it could give its own magneticaness. Suggestions—that the US and the Latin American countries would not invade Cuba, that, he believed, would correspond to the spirit of the President's letter. The Soviet Union believed that agreement could be quickly arrived at, but for that purpose efforts of at least three parties were required, and particularly the US. He said he would be happy to receive the US declaration for any other december.

Amb. Stevenson observed he did not understand what this was all should, but if the UESE wanted a draft document about what the UE would say with respect to assurances against invasion, we would be glad to produce such a draft, as indeed we had said two weeks ago. If Mr. Encertaes was interested in what we intended to draw do with respect to the latin American countries, we could perhaps give him a paper although we had already said what our intentions were. We could not be more specific should him. As to the language about the lifting of the blocked that would have to be done if the IL-36's were removed, but these would have been of the declaration.

As but there would have to be some if the Sevenson said that purhaps he could give

Mr. Manustage Manuscope on UE assurances to Cube against invasion perhaps tomorrow.

As but there concerning the latin American countries.

Mr. Enumetery asserted that the druft protocol contained provisions which in Soviet view should be included in any document. Perhaps those provisions were not complete, in particular with regard to the obligations of the Latin American



descript in Which is great deal of work had been done and it would like to have the WE where management on that document or US suggestions. If these negotiations were to be concluded, then it was obvious that their conclusion should be in the form of a document to be presented to the Security Council. There was nothing here that was hard to understand. He was surprised to hear Mr. Stevenson say he did not know what this was all about. He hoped that this did not mean that we would have to start all over again. The problem before us was not difficult, and if we proceeded to resolve it, then agreement could be reached on the form and the wording. However, all questions must be solved simultaneously and mid one by seas.

Only in such a manner could agreement be reached.

To sum up, Mr. Examption which in Soviet view derived from the Economic containing specific provisions which in Soviet view derived from the Economy-Ehrushchev exchange. The USSE was entitled to expect the other side, if it also believed it is necessary to some to a conclusion, to give its views on these proposals so that we could know where we stood. Element This was all the more so covered because the USSE believed that all questions were provided for in that document. However, the US, even without any study of the document, appeared to ignore it, and this did not attest to its desire to resolve the problem.

mentioned. She would give the USER draft language as for a declaration essentiate the lifthing of the blockade, assurances against as invasion, and steps to obtain ecoparation from latin America. Ash. Stevenson stressed, however, that as conclusions could be membershapeness take place before the IL-28 bombers were removed and verification of the transaction was worked out. While we would



be gial to give imagings for a declaration, perhaps temorror, we hoped the USSR would have proposals with respect to the IL-28 bonbers and verification.

Mr. Exerctery concluded the ecoversation by saying that the USER would wait

He vished to stress
for the US document and by exercising once again that it flowed from the President's

message that one must not small something but rather that agreement must be reached

on all questions at the same time. Only if such a procedure were adopted one

could see where he stood.

